Uganda's constitutional order separates the Attorney General from the Director of Public Prosecutions, yet the officers who exercise delegated prosecutorial authority within the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions are still commonly designated State Attorneys. This article argues that the designation is a constitutional misnomer. Its objection is not founded on etymology alone, nor does it claim that every prosecution conducted by an officer bearing that title is void. The argument rests on constitutional text, structure, history and role morality. Article 119 identifies the Government as the Attorney General's principal. Article 120 identifies no governmental client. It removes the DPP from external direction and replaces a principal's instructions with three controlling principles: public interest, the administration of justice and prevention of abuse of legal process. The article calls this the principal and principles distinction. It examines the genealogy of public, prosecution, prosecutor, attorney and state; compares the operative grammar of Articles 119, 120 and 250; and traces the disputed title through the 1962 and 1967 Constitutions and the Trial on Indictments Decree of 1971. That history shows that the terminology survived from an order in which the DPP was subordinate to the Attorney General. The article also confronts section 134 of the Trial on Indictments Act and comparative jurisdictions that use state based prosecutorial titles. It concludes that the title has statutory recognition and is not invalid by mere utterance, but it remains constitutionally inapt and institutionally hazardous. The proper reform is to designate ODPP counsel as Public Prosecutors or Prosecution Counsel, amend the older legislation, and make clear that prosecutorial authority derives from the DPP and is exercised for constitutional justice rather than as legal representation of the Government.